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Available online 16 June 2008Frequentdroughtsandgroundwaterdepletionarecritical constraints to improvingagricultural
productivity in the semi-arid tropics. India has been promoting integrated watershed
management in drought-prone areas to address these constraints. Watershed communities
are being assisted to invest in groundwater re-charging facilities. While communities and the
public bear such costs, individual farmers capture irrigation benefits. Groundwater is a free
common property resource and land users hold de-facto use rights. This has accelerated
private irrigation investments and depletion of aquifers resulting in iniquitous distribution of
irrigation water. Power subsidies and negligible pumping costs aggravate the problem. These
policy failuresand low irrigationcosts to farmersaredisplacingwater-efficient crops in favorof
water-intensive crops in water-scare areas. The paper reviews the village-level externalities
that aggravate groundwater depletion and evaluates potential policy options to enhance local
collective action in water management. Using 3SLS, an econometric crop-water productivity
model is used to evaluate alternative water policy instruments. The results indicate that
different types of water user charges can be introduced with modest consequences on
profitability and farm incomes. If properly implemented and managed by the local
communities, pro-poor policies could bring considerable sustainability benefits and also
ensure enhanced equity in access to the resource.
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India1. Introduction
In the last few decades, there has been a phenomenal increase
in groundwater extraction for irrigation, municipal and
industrial use worldwide. Higher rates of depletion are
observed in many countries where increasing population
pressure and expected economic gains have created strong
incentives to deplete the resource (World Bank, 1999). In India,
along with population growth, declining farm sizes, theiferaw).
er B.V. All rights reservedinherent risk of recurrent droughts in the drier areas, and
supportive policies for smallholder irrigation development
have induced land-use intensification and dramatic increases
in groundwater utilization. Between 1970 and 1994, the area
under groundwater irrigationmore than doubled (Shah, 2002).
By 2002, this has increased to 3.5 times while area under canal
irrigation increased by 1.5 times (Reddy, 2006). Currently,
groundwater is the single largest source of irrigation account-
ing for about 60% of the 50 million ha of irrigated land in the.
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fueled by the green revolution and increased adoption of high-
yielding varieties (Foster and Rosenzweig, 2005).
The availability of institutional credit for setting up bore
(tube) wells and power subsidies for pumping groundwater
have induced remarkable increases in the number of wells
(about 1 million in 1960 to 19 million in 2000) (Shah, 2002),
particularly in drier areas where surface water is scarce.While
this has made substantial contributions in reducing rural
poverty through raising agricultural productivity and farm
incomes, excessive extraction without sufficient investment
in re-charging facilities has led to faster depletion of ground-
water resources, especially in semi-arid regions (Reddy, 2005).
Even when the level of re-charging has increased, the
groundwater level is declining in many watersheds due to
unregulated use and over-exploitation. This is reflected in the
increasing drilling and extraction costs for farmers as well as
complete drying and abandonment of some wells. Some
studies indicate that up to 50% of wells once in use have
completely dried-up (Shah, 2002; Reddy, 2005).
Accelerated depletion of groundwater resources can have
adverse effects on the livelihoods of the rural poor that rely on
agriculture, especially in semi-arid areas where supplemental
irrigation is critical for crop growth (Reddy, 2005). Moreover,
water scarcity is projected to increase in the future as water
withdrawal for domestic, industrial and other uses increases
further. As growth opportunities in more favorable areas are
exhausted, there is a growing interest to improve productivity
in rainfed areas on the grounds of equity, efficiency and
sustainability. Thus, India has adopted integrated watershed
management as a viable strategy for improving productivity in
drought-prone and water-scarce areas (Farrington et al., 1999;
Kerr, 2001). Although substantial public and external funds are
being spent on watershed management, the economic and
environmental impacts of the program and the sustainability
of the interventions have been questioned (Joshi et al., 2004,b;
Reddy et al., 2007). Whereas supply-side interventions have
enhanced re-charging of groundwater, open-access external-
ities and adverse policies are threatening to offset these gains
as groundwater resources are depleted.
While competitive groundwater markets may help redis-
tribute the resource (Shah, 1993), suchmarkets often evolve in
regions where groundwater supplies are not limiting trade,
and hence much less developed in semi-arid areas. In the
presence of open-access externalities, distorting subsidies,
and physical barriers that limit wider water transfers,
informal water markets may not also effectively mitigate
depletion of groundwater resources. Addressing current and
future water constraints would require new policies and
institutional arrangements for supply augmentation and
demand management (World Bank, 1999). When supply is
constrained, innovative demand management would entail
adoption of water-saving technologies, localizedmanagement
and policy and institutional reforms that create incentives for
an in-situ water conservation.
This paper focuses on groundwater depletion and the
market and policy failures that discourage adoption of water-
saving agricultural practices and evaluates two promising
policy approaches that may motivate behavioral changes to
counter water depletion in semi-arid areas. We use primarydata collected through ICRISAT household and community
surveys in 12 semi-arid villages to track changes in irrigation,
and its effects on cropping patterns and depletion of aquifers.
The plot-level data is used to estimate the shadow price of
water which enters a jointly estimated econometric model of
net returns and irrigation intensitywith endogenous input use
equations. The model is used to evaluate alternative water
policies and their impacts on the returns to smallholder
irrigation.
The paper is organized as follows. The following section
outlines the watershed externalities and policy failures that
accelerate groundwater depletion. Section 3 presents the
theoretical framework for analysis of household decisions
under water and other family resource constraints. The empiri-
cal model and econometric specification issues are presented in
Section 4. The following section presents data and water use
patterns in the study villages. The empirical results are
discussed in Section 6, before we conclude in Section 7,
highlighting the key findings and policy implications.2. Groundwater depletion, externalities and
water charges
Groundwater resourcesmay include closed and open aquifers.
Closed aquifers are often isolated from other surface or
groundwater systems and may be considered non-renewable
and exhaustible— the time to depletion would depend on the
size of the aquifer and the level of annual withdrawal. Open
aquifers are connected to surface or other groundwater
systems and hencemay be considered as renewable. However,
these resources can also be exhausted when the level of
withdrawal exceeds the level of recharge. The natural process
of groundwater recharge can be enhanced artificially through
water harvesting and percolation systems that capture and
channel surfacewater into the ground. This implies that under
propermanagement systems that enhance the level of renew-
ability, someaquifers can bemanaged in a sustainablemanner
(Howe, 2002). New approaches and technical interventions
that increase re-charging of groundwater and provide income
and livelihood opportunities for poor people are being tested in
many semi-arid areas (Joshi et al., 2004a). However, ground-
water resources are fast disappearing inmany areas of India as
private irrigation investment and land-use intensification
have increased dramatically with increasing population pres-
sure. Foster and Rosenzweig (2005) find that for a given
distribution of landholdings growth in crop productivity on
irrigated land leads to both greater number and deeper tube
wells with likely consequence of decliningwater tables. This is
aggravated by recurrent droughts, inappropriate policies that
subsidize excessive use (e.g., free power for irrigation) and lack
of policy options that encourage collective action and inter-
nalize open-access externalities.
The impacts of watershed interventions in India are
directly linked to increased groundwater availability for
irrigation (Rao, 2000; Joshi et al., 2004b), making groundwater
management one of the key issues for the success and
sustainability of watershed programs. However, watersheds
are typically inhabited by a diverse group of farmers with
fragmented landholding patterns and resource use rights
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diversity within watersheds undermine the capacity for
collective action, unregulated access and use of groundwater
accelerates its depletion. As land is increasingly privatized,
groundwater has emerged as the most important common
property resource in several parts of India. Water rights are
never clearly defined and depend on land-use rights. Ground-
water use is unregulated and de facto open-access to all land
users in a given watershed. This generates significant open-
access externalities that lead to depletion of the resource.
Topographic and landownership conditions in watersheds
imply that externalities could flow in several directions
(reciprocal externalities) in such a way that resource use
decisions are highly interdependent among farmers and the
choices made by one affect several others. Increased ground-
water use from a common aquifer by a single user increases
the drilling and extraction costs to all well owners. If such
behavior persists, it can lead to complete drying up or
abandonment of some wells. While re-charging facilities
within watersheds are communal, unregulated private extrac-
tion of water as observed through increased drilling of new
wells could lead to open-access solutions that accelerate over-
pumping and depletion of aquifers.
In addition, irrigation water is charged only for public
sources, i.e., canal and tank irrigation systems. The rates are
often levied on the basis of the acreage irrigated, differentiated
by crop and season, butmay remain uniform in a given state. In
most of the cases irrigation charges cover less than a quarter of
the operation and maintenance costs of providing irrigation
(Reddy, 2003). On the other hand, private sources are not only
left out frompricing butalso supported throughgenerouspower
subsidies for pumping. The typical practice in India is fixed
electricity charges slightly differentiated on the basis of the
horsepower of groundwater pumps (World Bank, 1999). Neither
groundwaternor irrigationpoweruse in rural areasaremetered,
making volumetric pricing a difficult policy option. In fact the
recent trend has been to provide free power for irrigation. There
is a tendency to sanction such subsidies across states as
initiated in Andhra Pradesh during the 2004 elections.
Users therefore lack economic incentives to factor in the full
social cost of groundwater extraction. The under-pricing of
groundwater use is inefficient and provides fewer incentives for
adoption of water conserving technologies or replenishing
mechanisms (Hellegers et al., 2001). With increasing scarcity,
local informal markets have emerged in some areas where
water-deficient farmers rent water seasonally from water-
surplus farmers (Shah, 1993; Meinzen-Dick, 1998; Saleth, 1998).
However, groundwater markets remain underdeveloped in
many semi-arid areas where lack of sufficient surplus stifles
opportunities for expanded trade. Where informal markets
exist, water charges often vary by season and the type of crop
grown. Proper water pricing can improve the efficiency of water
use and stimulate water-saving behavior by encouraging adop-
tion of alternativewater-efficient strategies that generate higher
incomes (Shah, 1993; Easter et al., 1999).On theother hand, there
has been substantial reluctance against water markets and
adopting incentive-based instruments in South Asia for addres-
sing adverse externalities in agriculture (Saleth, 1998; Easter et
al., 1999). One argument is the potential negative impact of such
policies on the welfare of small farmers. This appears to be amisconception as the existingdistortedpolicies seem to bemore
detrimental to equity and to the livelihoods of the poor than
incentive-based policies that enhance equity and sustainability
of groundwater use (Prahladachar, 1994; Easter et al., 1999;
Reddy, 2005). The long-term benefits from sustainable use of
groundwater are likely to be much higher than unregulated
depletion that will foreclose future possibilities and increase
vulnerability of rural livelihoods to drought and other shocks.3. Theoretical framework
Several previous studies (e.g., De Janvry et al., 1991; Holden
et al., 2001; Shiferaw and Holden, 2000) have shown that when
rural markets do not function well, production and invest-
ment decisions will be non-separable from consumption
choices. When credit, labor, land and other factor markets
are imperfect, production and investment decisions will not
be separable from consumption and labor demand decisions
of the farm household (Singh et al., 1986). For example, when
labor, irrigation water and land markets are imperfect or
missing, the household's decision price for allocation of these
factors will be endogenous. In this case, non-separability
implies that the endowment of labor, land, irrigation water
and other fixed farm and household characteristics will
determine the level of production, conservation and house-
hold welfare. Assuming that some of these markets are
imperfect, we develop a generalizable non-separable model
whereby the farm household maximizes utility subject to
income, labor supply and irrigation water constraints:
Max u ¼ u Cq;Cm;Cl;H
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where, Cq is consumption of own crop produce, Cm is purchased
consumer goods, Cl is leisure time, q(.) is the yield function for
the production of crop j on plot t, and H represents fixed
household characteristics, p is the net price of output q, and e is
a vector of prices of other inputs including irrigation water (ew).
Ljt andWjt are labor and irrigation water used in the production
of crop j on land area Ajt. Crop yield is a function of inherent
quality of the soil (S), other farm characteristics (Z), and the use
of variable inputs — labor (L), water (W) and other inputs (X).
Eq. (2) states that household consumption expenditures should
not exceed net farm income (for simplicity other income is
considered exogenous and not included). Eqs. (3) and (4) define
the fixed factor constraints such that the use of labor (L) and
water (W) cannot exceed household endowments L– and W
__
t.
Unlike labor and other inputs, we assume that groundwater
availability is constrained at theplot levelmainly becausewater
1 About 45% of the households surveyed in the 12 villages of this
study own an irrigation pump. Of this, about 46% have reported a
pump jointly owned with other farmers.
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fragmented holdings of small farmers. The Lagrangian from
Eqs. (1) to (4) could be given as:
Max u ¼ u Cq;Cm;Cl;H
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The following first order conditions (FOCs) could be derived
from Eq. (5):
C : Au=Acj ¼ kp⁎c
where p⁎c ¼ Ppc for cz ¼ cq; cm
 
and p⁎c ¼ A=k for cz ¼ clf g
h i ð6Þ
L : Au=AL ¼ pj Aq=ALð Þ ¼ A=kð Þ ¼ p⁎l ð7Þ
W : Au=AWt ¼ pj Aq=AWt
  ¼ h=k ¼ e⁎wt ð8Þ
X : Au=AXi ¼ pj Aq=AXið Þ ¼ ei ð9Þ
The first order condition (FOC) in Eq. (7) shows that optimal
allocation of family labor will require the shadow price to be
equal to its marginal value product. Similarly, in the absence
of a water market, optimal allocation of irrigation water will
require the shadow price to be equal to its marginal value
product. Adding the FOCs for λ, μ, and θ, the systems (6) to (9)
could be solved to provide the utility maximizing allocation of
family labor, water and other inputs in production and the
demand system C⁎=c(p⁎,pl⁎,y⁎,H), where y⁎=ΣzpzCz+PlCl is the
full income of the household. If factor markets function well,
for a given crop grown (Cj), net returns (on plot t) to land and
family labor defined as total value of production less cost of
purchased inputs (πt=pqt−eXt) and input demands (Ft ) will be a
function of input and output prices and farm fixed character-
istics such that:
pt ¼ p pj;pl; ei; St;Zt
  ð10:1Þ
Ft ¼ f pj; pl; ei;St;Zt
 
for Fe A; L;Xð Þ ð10:2Þ
However, when some markets are missing or imperfect,
production and investment choices will be a function of
endogenous shadow prices of the output and/or input factors.
In this situation, crop productivity, input demand and con-
servation investments will be a function of the endogenous
prices (p⁎ and e⁎), exogenous prices ( p̄, ē) and household (H), plot
soil quality (S) and other farm fixed characteristics (Z). The
endogenous prices are, however, determined by the exogenous
prices and fixed factors such that e⁎=e⁎( p̄j, ēi, St, Zt, H) and
p⁎=p⁎( p̄j, ēi, St, Zt, H). This shows that the reduced forms of land
productivity and input demand equations will be given by:
pt ¼ p Ppj;Pei;St;Zt;H
 
ð11:1Þ
Ft ¼ f Ppj;Pei; St;Zt;H
 
for Fe A; L;Xð Þ ð11:2Þ
Nevertheless, in a cross-section of households in a given
location, the exogenous prices will not be expected to varysignificantly across households, i.e., all households face the
same prices. Hence, under market imperfections for some
factors, the estimable land productivity and input demand
functions for a given crop can be given as a function of non-
price exogenous factors:
pt ¼ p St;Zt;Hð Þ ð12:1Þ
Ft ¼ F St;Zt;Hð Þ for Fe A; L;Xð Þ ð12:2Þ
An imperfect ormissingwatermarket is particularly true in
much of Andhra Pradesh (AP) where power for irrigationwater
is free and informal markets are very thin. Unlike in northern
India and other states where informal watermarkets aremore
vibrant, water markets are very limited in many semi-arid
regions of AP partly because of shortage of surplus water and
traditional shared ownership of tube wells (e.g., Shah, 1993;
Somanathan andRavindranath, 2006).1Whenwater is free and
thenumber of transactions in informalmarkets is very limited,
the water market is largely imperfect and water prices are
endogenous to the resource user. As we show below, we use a
crop-water production function to estimate the plot and crop-
specific shadow price of water which is then used to estimate
the net returns from cropping and the intensity of irrigation.4. Empirical model
The level of use of different inputs in a given plot is an
endogenous decision by the household, determined based on
exogenous and pre-determined variables like crops grown,
access tomarkets, soil typesandhousehold assets. The returns
to land and input demandequations in Eqs. (12.1) and (12.2) are
therefore interdependent and need to be estimated jointly.
With plot-level data, the empirical model is formulated as a
system of the following six structural equations:
pt ¼ p ewt;Cj; It; St;Zt;H;R1
  ð13:1Þ
Xwt ¼ x ewt;Cj; Lt;Xft;K;St;Zt;H;R2
  ð13:2Þ
Lt ¼ L Cj;K;St;Zt;H;R3
  ð13:3Þ
Xft ¼ Xf Cj;K;St;Zt;H;R4
  ð13:4Þ
Xbt ¼ Xb Cj;K;St;Zt;H;R5
  ð13:5Þ
It ¼ I K; St;Ut;Vt;Zt;H;R6ð Þ ð13:6Þ
Vt ¼ V It;St;Zt;H;R7ð Þ ð13:7Þ
where the system of Eqs. (13.1)–(13.7), respectively, represents:
net returns to owned landand family labor, intensity of irrigation
(hours of irrigation), expenditure on labor (hired and family),
expenditure on fertilizer and pesticides, expenditure on other
capital inputs (bullocks, tractors, etc), cumulative (over 5 years)
expenditure on soil and water conservation (SWC), and market
Table 1 – Descriptive statistics for important variables
used in the analysis
Variables Mean SD Min. Max.
Household assets (Rs 1000/ha)
Total physical asset value 57.34 43.42 8.67 304.43
Livestock wealth 6.91 9.44 0.00 69.19
Total non-farm income 13.93 17.07 0.00 86.73
Household characteristics
Age of household head (in years) 44.73 11.17 25.00 76.00
Sex of household head
(1=Male, 2=Female)
1.05 0.21 1.00 2.00
Education of household head
(in years)
2.92 4.30 0.00 18.00
Family size (in number of members) 5.90 2.68 2.00 18.00
Belongs to backward caste 0.53 0.50 0.00 1.00
Belongs to scheduled caste 0.17 0.38 0.00 1.00
Belongs to minorities (Muslims) 0.08 0.27 0.00 1.00
Plot and farm characteristics
Farm size in hectares (owned area) 2.22 2.46 0.10 16.19
Total operated area irrigated (ha) 0.65 0.83 0.00 2.83
Stated value of the plot (Rs 1000/ha) 139.68 58.91 49.42 345.95
Land tenure (1=owned; 0=otherwise) 0.98 0.14 0.00 1.00
Irrigation plot (1=irrigated,
0=rainfed)
0.29 0.45 0.00 1.00
Plot located within the watershed
(1 if yes)
0.49 0.50 0.00 1.00
Soil type on plot (1=vertisol;
0=others)
0.72 0.45 0.0 1.00
Soil depth class: 1=shallow
(b0.5 m); 2=medium (0.5 to 1 m);
3=deep (1 to 1.5 m); 4=very deep
(N1.5 m)
1.98 0.81 1.00 4.00
Fertility of soil on the plot; 0=
very poor; to 3=very good
1.94 0.62 1.00 3.00
Plot-level input use (Rs 1000/ha)
Expenditure on labor (male and
female)
3.42 3.60 0.13 33.61
Expenditure on fertilizer, FYM, seed
and pesticides
3.54 3.69 0.03 27.83
Expenditure on other variable inputs 1.24 1.27 0.00 12.36
Credit used for 2 years 5.34 11.38 0.00 88.96
Plot-level returns (Rs 1000/ha)
Production value of the crop
(grain and by-product)
13.58 14.67 0.00 112.02
Returns to owned land and family
labor
7.43 11.15 −19.12 95.53
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calculated as total value of production less all variable costs
except family labor and owned land. For simplicity, continuous
variableswere standardized intoRs 1000/ha. Eq. (13.1) ismodeled
as a function of crop grown (Cj), shadow price of water (ew),
conservation expenditures (It), soil and plot characteristics (St),
household assets and farm characteristics (Zt), household
characteristics (H) and other exogenous variables (R).2 The
intensity of irrigation (13.2) on a given plot depends on the
price of water, crop grown, other inputs used and soil and farm
characteristics. Among the other variables, input use intensifica-
tion (13.3 to 13.5) and conservation (13.6) depends on the amount
of credit received (K). Private conservation (13.6) is specified as a
function of land quality (St), farm attributes Zt), public conserva-
tion investments (Ut), and the market value of the land as
perceived by the owner (Vt). The value of land (13.7) depends on
the level of private conservation effort (It), public conservation
investments (Ut) and land quality and farm characteristics.
We estimate the equation system using three-stage least
squares (3SLS), which provides consistent and asymptotically
efficient estimates (Greene, 1997). In order to ensure identifica-
tion for the parameters of the structural equation system,
certain identifying restrictions were imposed in such a way
that there are enough exogenous variables excluded fromeach
equation to serve as instruments for endogenous variables
included as regressors. The order condition criteria for identifi-
cation requires that the number of excluded exogenous
variables must be greater than or equal to the number of
included endogenous variables less 1 (Greene, 1997). This was
achieved by using in each equation a selected subset (based on
hypothesized relationships) of the variables St, Zt and H along
with other exogenous variables (R) as identifying restrictions
(instruments). The latter set included variables such as
household endowment of various assets, cropping season,
cropping pattern, crop rotations, land tenure, caste category
and village characteristics. All the dependent variables in the
model are continuous allowing us to estimate the structural
equation system using 3SLS. As net returns may have zero or
negative values, Eq. (13.1) was specified as a semi-log model.
The same is true for the intensity of irrigation (13.2) where
rainfed plots have zero levels of irrigation. All other equations
were specified in a double-log form. Because of space limita-
tions, we report only the results from Eqs. ((13.1) and (13.2)),
which are most relevant for this paper (results from the
remaining equations are available on request).Plot-level conservation investments (Rs 1000/ha)
Private (soil and water
conservation) investments
0.65 1.61 0.00 20.11
Public investment 0.70 1.55 0.00 11.86
Cropping patterns and crop choice
Cropping system: 1=sole cropping;
0=intercropping
0.64 0.48 0.00 1.00
Crop variety grown: 1=improved, 0.64 0.48 0.00 1.005. Data and trends in groundwater use
In this section we present the primary data used in estimating
the empirical model and emerging trends in the intensity of
irrigation, cropping patterns and groundwater depletion in the
studied villages.2 The variable capturing the farmer conservation effort (It) is
endogenous in this equation. Similarly, farmer conservation expen-
ditures depend on the perceived value of land and vice versa
(Eqs. (13.6) and (13.7)). As decisions are made by others, public
conservation investments onprivate plots are considered exogenous.
0=local
Vegetable crop (1 if yes) 0.17 0.37 0.00 1.00
Cotton crop (1 if yes) 0.06 0.24 0.00 1.00
Dryland cereal crop (1 if yes) 0.18 0.38 0.00 1.00
Legume crop (1 if yes) 0.28 0.45 0.00 1.00
Paddy and sugarcane (1 if yes) 0.06 0.23 0.00 1.00
(continued on next page)
Table 1 (continued )
Variables Mean SD Min. Max.
Cropping patterns and crop choice
Maize and wheat (1 if yes) 0.11 0.31 0.00 1.00
Oil seeds and spices (1 if yes) 0.07 0.26 0.00 1.00
Previous legume crop (1 if yes) 0.32 0.47 0.00 1.00
Season dummy: 1=Kharif, 0=Rabi 0.84 0.37 0.00 1.00
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The empirical model presented above was estimated based on
primary community, household and plot-level data collected
during the years 2002 and 2003 covering 12 randomly selected
villages in four semi-arid districts of Andhra Pradesh, India.
The survey was conducted by the authors as part of a larger
watershed study by the International Crops Research Institute
for the Semi-Arid Tropics (ICRISAT). Data from community
surveys provided useful information on investment trends in
irrigation, condition of irrigation wells, and changes in
cropping patterns. The household and plot-level data was
collected from six of the 12 villages studied where a stratified
random sample of 120 households was selected for a detailed
survey. Half of the sample came from a watershed project
village (Kothapally) where a community watershed project
has been operational since 1999. The other half came from
adjoining villages where such watershed management inter-
ventions have not been operational, representing typical
conditions in many semi-arid areas.
Along with other standard farm household data, a detailed
plot and crop-wise input and output data was collected from
the 509 operational plots of all sample households for the
2001/02 production year, which farmers characterized as an
average year. The unusually rich plot-level dataset contained
information on plot-specific soil quality, risk of soil degrada-
tion, slope gradients and soil and water conservation invest-
ments. Trained enumerators lived in the villages during the
course of the survey and administered in-person interviews in
all villages.
The majority of households use farmyard manure, fertili-
zer and pesticides. Fertilizer and pesticide use on some
irrigated crops is high. Households ranked shortage of
irrigationwater (in all villages) as themost pressing constraint
in improving their incomes and securing their livelihoods.
Some low level informal markets for irrigation water that
allow seasonal water transfers through various contracts have
emerged in the villages. The major cropping period is duringTable 2 – The average increase in number of wells per village in
District Tube or bore wells
1980 1990 2003 C
Ranga Reddy (6 villages) 2.3 5.8 25.3
Mahboobnagar (2 villages) 12.0 37.3 66.0
Nalgonda (2 villages) 6.0 35.0 64.7
Kurnool (2 villages) 7.0 33.3 52.7
Source: ICRISAT Community Watershed Surveys (2003).the monsoon rains (June–September), but some crops are also
grown during the post-rainy season. Crop production is highly
diversified and farmers practice intercropping. The descriptive
statistics for some of the relevant household and plot-level
variables used in this study are given in Table 1.
5.2. Changes in irrigation intensity and groundwater
depletion
Data from the community surveys in the 12 villages show that,
consistent with observed broader trends in India, the number
of pump-operated open and tube wells has shown a tremen-
dous increase in the last 20 years (Table 2). While farmers in
semi-arid regions have historically relied on open wells for
supplementary irrigation, the availability of subsidized power
has increasingly shifted farmers towards tube wells operated
using electrical pumps. Since the early 1980s, the number of
tube wells has increased by four to ten fold, while open wells
have increased by up to three fold. Hence, tube wells are
gradually overtaking open wells in many semi-arid villages.
The average depth of open and tube wells, estimated at 12.5 m
and 61.2 m in 2003, is increasing further as farmers despe-
rately try to drill deeper as water tables fall. The area under
irrigation in these villages has also increased three to five-fold
during the last 20 to 25 years.
The accelerated exploitation of aquifers without sufficient
investment in re-charging facilities already shows the unsus-
tainable nature of water use in these villages. More than 65%
of open wells and 28–45% of the tube wells in the 12 semi-arid
villages studied have been depleted and gone out of service
(Table 3). This is based on the well being dry for over three
consecutive years. The rate of depletion is lower for tube wells
mainly because tube wells are relatively new and deeper. In
many of the villages, more than 90% of the open wells have
been depleted. This process is accelerated by recurrent
droughts and lack of sufficient re-charging of aquifers. These
results show that unless households and communities make
sufficient investments in groundwater re-charging systems
and adopt regulating mechanisms, the remaining aquifers are
likely to be depleted in the near future.
5.3. Changes in cropping patterns
In response to improved access to irrigation and changing
market opportunities, the composition and mix of crop-
livestock production activities in the semi-arid areas of India
has changed significantly over the years. Comparing 1968–70
to 1992–94, Gulati and Kelley (1999) found falling shares insemi-arid districts of Andhra Pradesh, India
Open wells
hange (%) 1980 1990 2003 Change (%)
1000 24.2 39.3 60.3 149
450 20.7 38.3 60.0 190
978 12.7 47.3 51.7 300
652 24.0 46.0 57.7 140
Table 3 – Small-scale irrigation and groundwater depletion
in selected districts, AP, India.
Districts Tube or bore wells
dried-up (%)
Open wells
dried-up (%)
Ranga Reddy
(6 villages)
44.7 65.4
Mahboobnagar
(2 villages)
43.3 93.1
Nalgonda
(2 villages)
28.2 90.0
Kurnool
(2 villages)
40.2 90.2
Source: ICRISAT Community Watershed Surveys (2003).
333E C O L O G I C A L E C O N O M I C S 6 7 ( 2 0 0 8 ) 3 2 7 – 3 4 0gross cropped area in the Indian semi-arid areas for sorghum,
pearl millet, cotton and groundnut in marginal areas and
rising shares for high-value crops like sunflower, soybean,
mustard and chickpea. In more favorable and irrigated semi-
arid areas, they found rising shares for wheat, paddy, cotton
and oilseeds and declining shares for chickpea, millets,
sorghum and barley. We find a similar pattern from our
micro-level evidence in the selected villages (Fig. 1). In the last
25 years, farmers have significantly reduced the area under
sorghum. But the area under oil crops, maize, vegetables and
flowers has grown significantly. The area under rice and
chickpea seems to be relatively more stable.
The increasing shift towards irrigated crops (e.g. vegetables
and flowers) is motivated by the higher returns from increased
market access. When irrigation water is heavily subsidized or
available at low cost, farmers find it profitable to shift towards
flowers, sugarcane, vegetables, rice and turmeric (Table 4).
Unfortunately, the emerging cropping pattern is likely to hastenFig. 1 –Changes in area allocated to different crops in six villages.
who grew the crops since 1980. The values for the pre-2001 periodgroundwater depletion. Table 4 showshowthecurrent cropping
systems and water allocation relate to the net productivity of
water. About 40%of the cultivated area receives some irrigation.
Vegetables and paddy represent over half of the total irrigated
area.Water requirements (h/ha) are highest forwater-intensive
crops like sugarcane, paddy and wheat, grown only under
irrigation. For other crops such as flowers, chickpea, cotton and
vegetables, water is applied only in the form of supplemental
irrigation. Water productivity is highest for high-value crops
with low water demand and lowest for water-intensive crops
like paddy and sugarcane. Since irrigation water is free, water
allocation patterns do not reflect its marginal value. Paddy
accounts for less than a quarter of the irrigated area, but
consumes over 60% of the applied water. Crops with high water
productivity (e.g., flowers, vegetables, chickpea and cotton)
receive less than 20% of the available water. This provides
stronger evidence to change the structure of incentives that
stimulatewater-intensive and unsustainable cropping patterns
in semi-arid areas.6. Results and discussion
6.1. Estimated shadow price of water
One of the key questions that need to be answered in
agricultural water pricing is the marginal value of water in
growing different crops. The marginal value of water estab-
lishes the farmer's maximum willingness to pay for an
additional unit of irrigation water (Tsur, 2005). This can also
be used to determine the inverse demand curve for water. If
data on average and marginal costs of water supply is
available, then the marginal value of water can be used in(Values in parenthesis are the number of sample households
are approximate three-year averages centered on that year).
Table 4 – Farmers' irrigation decisions and water productivity relationships
Crops Area
cultivated
(ha)
Area
irrigated
(ha)
Area
irrigated
(%)
Intensity of
water use
(h/ha)
Net returns
(Rs 1000/ha) a
Net water
productivity
(Rs/h)
Actual irrigation
(h)
Total water
applied
(%)
Cotton 0.17 0.02 3.66 26.19 10.23 391 0.473 0.49
Flowers 0.15 0.07 13.74 71.96 26.45 368 4.875 5.01
Chickpea 0.11 0.04 8.61 21.24 7.20 339 0.902 0.93
Vegetables 0.24 0.15 30.49 76.92 13.41 174 11.562 11.88
Turmeric 0.05 0.05 10.15 94.38 15.59 165 4.723 4.85
Maize 0.26 0.01 2.02 56.61 9.03 160 0.563 0.58
Wheat 0.03 0.03 6.41 109.01 5.36 49 3.446 3.54
Paddy 0.11 0.11 22.72 530.96 11.07 21 59.473 61.13
Sugarcane 0.01 0.01 1.47 1541.94 22.58 15 11.143 11.45
Sum 1.24 0.49 100 – – – 97.29 100
Source: Estimated based on average cropping and irrigation decisions of sample farmers (n=120). h=hours.
a Rs 46=US$1 (2002/03).
Table 5 – The crop-water production function and shadow
value of irrigation water
Dept variable=production
value (Rs 1000)
Estimated
coefficient
Robust T-values
Labor costs (1000 Rs) 1.820 4.15⁎⁎⁎
Fertilizer and pesticide costs 1.347 4.4⁎⁎⁎
Other variable costs −0.430 −0.48
Total hours of irrigation 0.065 2.07⁎⁎
Irrigation h squared −3.33E−5 −0.28
Labor costs squared −0.092 −2.06⁎⁎⁎
Fert and pesticide cost squared −0.016 −0.69
Other costs squared 1.110 3.71⁎⁎⁎
Education of head (years) 0.039 1.12
Crop variety (Improved=1) 0.625 1.75⁎
Season (Kharif=1) 0.312 0.6
Incidence of stress (yes=1) −3.444 −7.8⁎⁎⁎
Local soil (Regadi=1) 1.338 1.74⁎
Local soil (Baraka=1) 1.112 1.38
Plot size (acres) 1.482 6.29⁎⁎⁎
Cotton crop dummy −0.253 −0.29
Vegetable crop dummy −0.977 −1.6
Pulses crop dummy −0.725 −1.28
Dryland cereals crop dummy −1.593 −2.83⁎⁎⁎
Oil seeds and spices dummy −2.283 −2.93⁎⁎⁎
Paddy crop dummy −0.890 −0.52
Labor costs×irrigation h −0.011 −4.47⁎⁎⁎
Other costs×irrigation h −0.010 −2.29⁎⁎
Fertilizer costs×irrigation h 0.025 3.66⁎⁎⁎
Pesticide costs×irrigation h −0.009 −0.95
Farmyard manure×irrigation h −0.029 −3.68⁎⁎⁎
Plot size×irrigation h 0.031 4.78⁎⁎⁎
Maize and wheat×irrigation h −0.131 −3.31⁎⁎⁎
Vegetable dummy×irrigation h −0.069 −2.36⁎⁎
Paddy dummy×irrigation h −0.105 −4.00⁎⁎⁎
Pulses dummy×irrigation h 0.056 0.53
Oils and spices
dummy×irrigation h
0.031 0.84
Season dummy×irrigation h 0.001 0.04
Soil depth×irrigation h 0.012 2.73⁎⁎⁎
Dist to check-dam
(km)×irrigation h
−0.101 −2.18⁎⁎
Location of plot in catchment −0.226 −1.3
Constant −0.387 −0.34
Adjusted R2 0.7512
Sample size (plots) 509
⁎, ⁎⁎, ⁎⁎⁎ represent significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.
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inverse demand curve equals the average or marginal cost of
water supply. The shadow value of water can be derived in
different ways (Tsur, 2005). The most common method is
based on constrained profit maximization where water
availability is constrained at a certain level. This can be
specified using linear or non-linear programming methods.
The dual multiplier for the water constraint determines the
shadow value of water. This is ameasure of the gain in income
from relaxing the water constraint by one unit. The inverse
water demand curve can be derived by solving the model for
different levels of the water constraint. The second method
which is also liked to profit maximization is the use of the
crop-water value function where the value of output is
regressed against the volume of water use and other factors.
This assumes that water availability is constrained at a level
(x); hence, the marginal value product pf'(x) will be the
maximal price the farmer is willing to pay to relax the water
constraint. Using plot-level data, we employ the second
approach to derive the shadow price of water. This is
estimated using a non-linear crop-water production function
where the value of production on a given plot depends on the
hours of irrigation, use of farm inputs, soil quality and other
plot characteristics and exogenous factors. In order to capture
any indirect and differential effects of irrigation, we included
interaction terms with selected input use and crop types. The
estimated model (Table 5) is highly significant. The direct
effect of irrigation hours is significant (Pb0.05) while the
second term is negative suggesting diminishing marginal
returns as water use increases. Significant interaction terms
also show that the marginal effects vary according to the level
of use of other inputs (fertilizer, labor, manure, etc), plot size,
soil quality and the crop grown.
The net marginal value of irrigationwas then computed for
irrigated plots using the derivatives with respect to irrigation
hours and significant interaction terms. The averagemarginal
value of water is about Rs 50 per hour of irrigation. The
marginal values across crops are Rs 114 for pulses, 98 for
flowers, 95 for oil seeds and spices, 40 for vegetables and 4.5 for
paddy. This clearly indicates that the scarcity value of water is
lowest on water-intensive crops. If one uses average cost
pricing, which suggests a price level that equates the inverse
Table 6 – The effect of irrigation water pricing on net
returns to land and family labor for different crops
Variables (dependent
variable=net returns
Rs 1000/ha)
Parameter
estimate
T-values Elasticitiesa
Intercept 10.54 2.60⁎⁎⁎
Price of water
(Rs/h of irrigation)
−0.041 −2.11⁎⁎ −0.311
Ln (private SWC
investment per ha)
−0.030 −0.32 −0.005
Ln (predicted non-farm
income per ha)
−0.118 −1.57 −0.02
Ln (cumulative 2 years
credit per ha)
−0.078 −1.40 −0.01
Soil type dummy
(vertisols=1)
0.436 0.36 0.07
Soil depth 1.547 2.37⁎⁎ 0.461
Soil fertility level −0.596 −0.78 −0.175
Season (Kharif=1) 1.362 1.09 0.205
Land tenure (owned=1) −1.151 −0.39 −0.173
Crop variety
(improved=1)
2.204 2.24⁎⁎ 0.332
Incidence of stress
(Yes=1)
−8.797 −7.23⁎⁎⁎ −1.323
Cotton dummy −6.214 −2.56⁎⁎ −0.93
Vegetable dummy −8.305 −4.19⁎⁎⁎ −1.25
Pulse crop dummy −9.731 −4.93⁎⁎⁎ −1.46
Dryland cereals dummy −11.880 −5.81⁎⁎⁎ −1.79
Maize andwheat dummy −9.777 −4.36⁎⁎⁎ −1.47
Oils and spices dummy −11.221 −5.00⁎⁎⁎ −1.69
Paddy and sugarcane
dummy
−9.816 −3.54⁎⁎⁎ −1.48
Previous legume crop
dummy
0.536 0.58 0.08
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(Tsur, 2005), the real price of water may be around Rs 5–10/h.3
The average cost is estimated from cost of irrigation labor and
average pump repair and running costs using 2003 prices. In
the next section we discuss how this kind of pricing would
affect the farm-level profitability of irrigation.
6.2. Effect of water pricing on farm income
We use the empirical model (Eq. (13.1)) jointly estimated with
other equations to assess the effect of water pricing on farm-
level net returns and incomes. The estimated plot-wise shadow
prices (Rs/h of irrigation) were included in the system of
equations to assess how water pricing will affect the farm-
level profitability of different crops and the intensity of use of
irrigation water. The plot-wise net returns (after accounting for
cost ofwater)werespecifiedasa functionof estimatedplot-wise
shadow price of water, private conservation investments, non-
farm income, credit acquired during the previous 2 years, soil
and plot characteristics, crop variety, incidence of stress
(drought, pest and/or disease), farm size, irrigation, household
education and identifiers for the type of crop grownon the plot.4
Since non-farm income was considered endogenous in the
model, it was instrumented using its predicted values. The
results for Eq. (13.1) are presented inTable 6. Asexpected thenet
returns from crop production are negatively correlated to water
prices and incidence of stress factors on the plot. Credit, non-
farm income and conservation investments seem to have a
negative effect, but the estimated parameters were not sig-
nificantly different from zero. Similarly net returns increase
with improved soil conditions, adoption of new varieties, and
investment in irrigation. On average, returns per ha are Rs 2200
higheronplotswherenewhigh-yieldingcultivars and improved
varieties are grown. However, controlling for other factors, net
returns on average decline by more than Rs 8700/ha when
drought or pest and/or diseases affects the plot.
Farm-level net returns for several crop groups are lower
compared to high-value crops (flowers) used as a reference
group. The dryland cereals (sorghum and millets) and other
cereals (maizeandwheat) followedbypaddyanddrylandpulses
seem to be the least profitable compared to the high-value
flower crops. The most important result for the purpose of this
paper is the effect of water prices and irrigation on plot-level net
returns from crop production. After controlling for soil quality,
input use, crop type and other variables that affect crop yields,
net returnson irrigatedplots are significantlyhigher (Rs5800/ha)
than non-irrigated plots. On average, a 10% increase in irrigated
area increases net returns by about 9%. This showswhy farmers3 An hour of irrigation may be roughly equivalent to 12.3 m3 of
water, giving an estimated price of Rs 1.22 to 2.45 per m3 of
irrigation water using average cost pricing of Rs 5–10/hr. This is
estimated using the relationship (Michael, 1989): water discharge
(lt/s)= [HP of pump ⁎76 ⁎efficiency of pump)/ (well depth (m)]. We
use an average depth of 200 ft and 5 HP pump with an efficiency
of 60% for irrigators in the surveyed villages.
4 The crop grown on the plot may be considered endogenous,
but lack of good exogenous instruments to predict crop choice has
made it difficult to estimate this jointly. The crop dummies are
used here to capture the differential effects of water pricing on
net returns for different crops.are willing to invest in groundwater exploration, extraction and
deepening of existingwells, leading to a dramatic increase in the
area irrigated and the number of wells.
As expected, plot-level profits decrease with an increase in
the price of irrigationwater. On average, net returns decline by
Rs 41/ha per unit increase in the hourly shadow price of
irrigation water. The relative decline in net returns varies by
crop type and the amount of irrigation hours required. This is
consistent with our earlier estimate of Rs 50 as the average
shadow value of an hour of irrigation in agriculture in the
studied semi-arid villages. How would such pricing affect
smallholder irrigation and crop-wise net returns? We turn to
this analysis in the next section.Log (farm size–plot size) 0.035 0.26 0.01
Irrigation dummy 5.822 3.31⁎⁎⁎ 0.88
Watershed dummy 0.760 0.72 0.11
Ln (years of education
for head)
0.018 0.37 0.003
Model fitness System weighted R2=0.84, degrees of
freedom=2909
⁎, ⁎⁎, ⁎⁎⁎ represent statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels,
respectively.
a Elasticities at the means for the logarithmic variables are
computed as bi=
P
Y , where βi is the estimated parameter, and Y
_
is the
mean of the dependent variable. For the dummy variables, the
values are for positive value of the indicator.
Table 7 – The effect of water pricing on hours of irrigation
Variables (dependent
variable=hours of
irrigation/ha)
Parameter
estimate
T-value P-value
Intercept (no intercept) 0
Water prices (Rs/h of irrigation) −0.60 −2.08 0.038
Vegetable dummy −7.35 −0.32 0.753
Pulse crop dummy −28.04 −1.04 0.299
Maize and wheat dummy −2.96 −0.12 0.904
Oils and spices dummy 15.01 0.54 0.587
Paddy and sugarcane dummy 578.42 15.14 b .0001
Crop variety (improved=1) 5.69 0.36 0.717
Season (Kharif=1) 20.67 1.05 0.293
Soil type dummy (vertisols=1) −13.10 −0.74 0.461
Soil depth 8.63 0.92 0.356
Ln (male workforce per ha) 0.81 0.3 0.764
Ln (female workforce per ha) −5.45 −0.61 0.541
Ln (labor costs/ha) −50.07 −1.48 0.139
Ln (fertilizer, seed and
pesticide costs/ha)
32.50 1.8 0.073
Ln (other farm input costs/ha) −5.26 −0.59 0.556
Watershed village (=1) −12.37 −0.7 0.487
Ln (Plot size, ha) −27.21 −1.45 0.148
Ln (total irrigable land, ha) 7.61 4.28 b .0001
Ln (distance to check-dam, km) 1.69 0.44 0.659
Ln (age of household head) 24.85 2.45 0.015
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One of the important policy objectives in introducing irrigation
water pricing is to enhance the sustainability of groundwater by
reducing the level of water use. There is lack of information on
how smallholder irrigators may respond in terms of reducing
the intensity of water use if a water pricing policy was adopted.
We use our empirical model (Eq. (13.2)) estimated jointly with
net returns to estimate this effect. The results are presented in
Table 7. The intensity ofwateruse (irrigationh/ha)wasmodeled
as a function of water prices, crop grown, season, soil quality
and plot attributes, level of use of different inputs (endogenous),Fig. 2 –Effect of full water pricing for irrigation (chtotal irrigable area, plot size, distance to water harvesting
facilities and family labor and household characteristics. We
find a positive and significant effect of paddy cropping, fertilizer
and pesticide use, total irrigable area and household age on the
intensity of irrigation. The intensity of water use is highest on
rice fields compared to other less water-intensive crops like
flowers (reference group). Interestingly, elder farmers with
larger irrigable land seem to apply more water per unit of land.
This seems to follow from the open-access and unregulated
nature of groundwater use in the villages.
As anticipated, water prices are negatively correlated with
the intensity of water use (h/ha).We find that for a unit increase
in the price of water, the intensity of irrigation will decrease by
0.6 h/ha. The estimated price elasticity of irrigation water
demand at the average shadow price and water demand of all
crops is about −0.15, which implies that if water prices increase
by 10%,water demandwill decrease by 1.5%. This indicates that
although farmers are likely to reduce irrigation water use if
water is priced, the price responsiveness seems to be quite low.
6.4. Potential of alternative water pricing approaches
Alternative strategies ranging from supply augmentation to
demand management have been advocated for better man-
agement of scarce water resources (World Bank, 1999).
Consistent with these comprehensive strategies, a number
of policy instruments and economic incentives can be
suggested for effective water management in agriculture
(Tiwari and Dinar, 2002). However, actual volumes of ground-
water extraction and use in small-scale irrigation in develop-
ing countries are not metered and hence cannot be directly
observed. This makes farm-level direct volumetric charges an
infeasible policy option (Gornish et al., 2004). An incentive-
based approach that relates pricing to the volume of water is
therefore more likely to perform better than regulatory
approaches that specify quotas and standards on the volume
of water or irrigated acreage (Schaible, 2000; Tiwari and Dinar,
2002). While several options can be used to create economic
incentives for water-saving, equity issues are critical inarges for total hours of use) on crop incomes.
5 The full effect of the water price on income is estimated as
β0+ϕew(W+γew) where β0 is the net return when water is free, ϕ
(negative) measures the decline in profits per unit price of water
ew is the assumed price of water,W is the hours of irrigation, and
γ(negative) measures the reduction in irrigation hours due to
price changes.
Fig. 3 –Effect of partial (block) water pricing (50% of water use) for irrigation on crop incomes.
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The main challenge is to understand how introduction of
alternative pricing systems would affect profitability of small-
scale irrigation and agricultural incomes.
Pricing approaches that build from local experiences would
also have a better chance of acceptance. In the past, farmers in
the semi-arid areas of Andhra Pradesh used output sharing
schemeswhere the irrigator pays up to a quarter of the produce
to the well owner. The informal water markets have however
gradually declined as water availability has decreased with
expansionofhigh-yieldingvarieties and irrigatedcrops.Output-
based pricing approaches however require information on the
level of output, which is difficult to observe under smallholder
conditions (Gornishetal., 2004). In suchsituationsandwhen the
flow is predictable, the time used for irrigation could be a good
proxy for volumeofuseand relatively easier tomonitor. In some
parts of south Asia (e.g. north India and Bangladesh), charges
based on irrigation hours are becoming quite common in
informal markets. Another widely used approach worldwide is
a pricing scheme based on the area of irrigated crops. Using
results fromour econometricmodels,we therefore evaluate two
alternative incentive-based instruments: (a) charges based on
hours of irrigation, and (b) charges based on irrigated crop area.
While the former is directly related to volumeof use, the second
approachmaynot always reflectvolume.Asweshowbelow, the
two approaches can also be applied jointly, making the
instruments complimentary.
6.4.1. Charges based on irrigation hours
As discussed earlier, volumetric water charges are impractical
in many developing regions where the infrastructure needed
to routinelymeasure the volume used by individual farmers is
lacking. Hence, volumetric methods are used in less than 25%
of the cases worldwide, mainly in the developed countries
(Tsur, 2005). The advantage of volume-based pricing is that it
is incentive compatible as the marginal cost of the last unit of
water used is positive. If local communities and user groups
are empowered tomanage and implement time-based pricing,information on the duration of irrigation (as a proxy for
volume of use) can be easily gathered or inferred indirectly
from the type of crop grown.
We use the econometric results to assess how charges based
on irrigation hours would affect the profitability of cropping.
Using the average level of irrigation needed for each crop, this is
evaluated by varying water charges and examining how such
pricing would affect net returns for different irrigated crops
(Fig. 2). The effect of water charges on net returns includes the
direct effect ofwater pricing on restricted farmprofits (Eq. (13.1))
and the indirect effects on reduction in the intensity of irrigation
(Eq. (13.2)). These values are derived from results reported in
Tables 6 and 7.5 The values for zero water charges (Fig. 2) reflect
the status quo where groundwater is free for irrigators. If water
prices are introduced for irrigation, the results show that farm-
level net returnswould remain positive for less water-intensive
crops up to the level of Rs 3.5/h. The situation is different for
wheat and rice which requires about 110 and 530 h/ha,
respectively. Paddy and wheat production in semi-arid areas
would not be profitable if water is charged more than Rs 0.5/h,
but thismay increaseup toRs1/ha if chargesarebasedon50%of
the water used. On the other hand, water charges can increase
up to Rs 5–10 for less water-intensive high-value crops like
pulses, flowers and cotton. This shows that if water pricing is
introduced, it is likely to shift croppingpatters fromirrigated rice
andwheat towards less water-intensive cropsmore suitable for
water-scarce semi-arid areas.
An alternative pro-poor policy would be a variation of
block-pricing that would allow farmers pay only for a certain
portion of their irrigation water use. We evaluated how such a,
Table 8 – Effect of area-based charges on water use and irrigation incomes (Rs 1000)
Irrigated crops Irrigation
(h/ha)
Baseline (free water
for irrigators)
Fixed area charges using
average crop-water
demand (Rs 1/h) a
Area charges using crop-wise
water demand (Rs 1/h)
Area irrigated Water use (h) Area irrigatedb Water use (h) Area irrigatedb Water use (h)
Flowers 71 0.33 23.43 0.120 8.52 0.30 21.30
Cotton 26 0.23 5.98 0.040 1.04 0.25 6.50
Vegetables 76 0.34 25.84 0.060 4.56 0.15 11.40
Pulses 26 0.38 9.88 0.025 0.65 0.14 3.64
Maize and wheat 124 0.29 35.96 0.020 2.48 0.03 3.47
Oil seeds and spices 90 0.40 36.00 0.070 6.30 0.14 12.60
Paddy rice 530 0.37 196.10 0.050 26.50 0.02 8.48
All crops 179 2.34 333.19 0.385 50.05 1.02 67.39
Irrigation income 30.95 6.40 16.03
a Based on average crop-water demand of 179 h/ha irrigated.
b This is the maximum estimated area that will make crop production profitable under the water charging policy.
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pricing i.e., farmers pay only for half of their water use (Fig. 3).
As expected, block-pricing improves the profitability of all
crops, but paddy and wheat production still remains less
profitable even when farmers pay only for half of their water
use. Other dryland crops remain profitable for water charges
up to Rs 10/h. In some cases, farmers may also be able to grow
some crops under rainfed conditions which offer net returns
in the order of Rs 3000–4000/ha. In this case, the optimal water
price under the block-pricing approach is likely to be around
Rs 3–5/h of irrigation. This would allow farmers use irrigation
to supplement rainfed cropping and reduce income variability
and vulnerability of livelihoods in drought-prone areas.
6.4.2. Area-based water charges
A common and easy to implement approach to water pricing is
an area-based water charge. Tsur (2005) cites that about 60% of
irrigationwater pricing casesworldwideuse this approach. This
can take two forms: fixed charges for all crops per acre irrigated
or crop and area-based charges that take into account crop-
water requirements. A fixed rate per irrigated area does not
consider the volume of water used and may in fact encourage
excessive application as the marginal cost of water is close to
zero. Acreage-based charges for irrigation, if differentiated by
crop-water demand, could however create incentives for farm-
ers to plant less water-consuming crops (Gornish et al., 2004).
We evaluated the effect of these two approaches on area
irrigated, water demand and farm net incomes. The first
approach uses area charges based on average water demand
of 179 h/ha (excluding sugarcane). The second refines this by
combining crop-water demand and irrigated areas. The results
are presented in Table 8. When area charges do not take into
account crop-specific water demand, the impacts on irrigated
area and farm incomes are quite dramatic. This is mainly
because dryland crops do not require 179 h/ha irrigated and
charges based on this high rate would limit area irrigated
substantially. Hence, net income from irrigation falls signifi-
cantly. If area charges consider crop-specific water demand,
area irrigated and water use decrease but much less than the
non-targeted area pricing. The negative effect on farm incomes
isnot severe but remains significant. This assumes that farmers
pay for area irrigated based on all hours of irrigation, indicatingthat cost-sharing or block-pricing approaches will also be
needed to minimize the negative effects on short-term farm
incomes.Targetedarea-basedcharges thatdiscriminateaccord-
ing to the crop irrigated are more effective in terms shifting
production towards less water-intensive crops while also
reducing the negative effects on farm incomes.7. Conclusions
The results from this study show that the unregulated use and
depletion of groundwater is likely to have serious consequences
for poor farmers as their livelihoods will have to depend
increasingly on drought-prone and risky rainfed agriculture.
Coupled with indirect subsidies that lower the relative profit-
ability of water-efficient dryland crops, the availability of free
water for irrigation is shifting cropping patterns in favor of
water-intensive crops that should not be encouraged in water-
deficit areas. Unregulated extraction of groundwater resources
undermines the ongoing efforts for integrated and sustainable
management of watersheds being promoted widely in India.
Given theopen-access externalities, lowpumping costs and free
access to water that jointly encourage groundwater depletion,
water charges may be considered a suitable policy option to
mitigate depletion of aquifers in semi-arid areas where water-
intensive cropping patterns are expanding.
Using plot-level data, and an econometric model developed
using a farm household decision framework, we estimated the
shadow price of water and evaluated alternative water pricing
options and their likely impacts. The policy analyses aimed to
evaluate time-based and area-based instruments for irrigation
water pricing. The results indicated a good potential for using
any or a mix of the two approaches. We found that the average
shadow value of water in the semi-arid villages is about Rs 50/h
of irrigation but this value increases up to two-folds for high-
value crops or falls to one-tenth for water-intensive crops like
paddy and wheat. The effectiveness of pricing instruments
could be further enhanced if the hourly charges could be
differentiated by the pump capacity, and when the area-based
charges are varied by crop-water demand. If these options are
carefully introduced, they are likely to induceadoptionofwater-
saving technologies and shift cropping patterns towards high-
339E C O L O G I C A L E C O N O M I C S 6 7 ( 2 0 0 8 ) 3 2 7 – 3 4 0value crops with low water demand. The incremental income
and profitability effects analyzed here could be used to assess
the likely impacts of alternative water policy approaches on
farm-level water-saving and the livelihoods of poor farmers.
The results showed that full water pricing will have significant
negative effects on short-term farm incomes, but this can be
reduced if pro-poor approaches where farmers pay a portion of
the total water used for irrigation is adopted along with
strategies that encourage water-saving practices.
Considering the current political reluctance to adopt such
policies, there could be several mechanisms for introducing
water user charges. Perhaps the best option is for the commu-
nities themselves toagree onanequitable andmore sustainable
policy and locally manage the funds. The watershed commu-
nities can use such scarcity rent funds to further develop water
re-charging systems, enhancemarket linkages for water-saving
crops and expand equity effects through employment opportu-
nities for landless and low-income groups. However, improve-
ments in water productivity may not necessarily translate into
large scale (e.g., basin level) water-saving as this would depend
on several factors that influence the total volume of agricultural
water use. Water-saving would be possible only if farmers use
lesswater overall in agricultural activities.Watermarkets alone
may not also bring about improvements in water use efficiency
andwater-saving unless supported by changes in other distort-
ing policies and removal of subsidies for power and water-
intensive irrigated crops.
The success of these policy choices will therefore depend on
whether communities are prepared to forego short-term
benefits and governments are able to remove policies that
encourage depletion of groundwater. The present deadlock over
someof thehardpolicydecisions for groundwatermanagement
in India is fueled by the notion that farmers will reject policies
that affect their livelihoods. This may be correct to the extent
that groundwater remains an open-access resource and com-
munities lack information about available stocks and sustain-
able levels of extraction. Future policy for groundwater
management should aim at improving local knowledge on
available groundwater stocks, consequences of unregulated
use, and sustainable levels of extraction; and promoting water-
saving practices and institutional arrangements to foster
collective action. In the long-term, there is a need for
diversification of income through development of non-farm
livelihood strategies. We anticipate that the smallholder farm-
ers would ultimately gain from such policies that improve
equity and sustainability of groundwater resources that under-
pin their livelihoods.R E F E R E N C E S
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